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Abstract
The Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) is used by some local health departments
(LHDs) to monitor emergency room and clinic data for disease outbreaks. Using actual chief
complaint data from local public health clinics, we evaluate how EARS—both the baseline system
distributed by the CDC and two variants implemented by one LHD—perform at locally detecting
the 2009 influenza A H1N1 pandemic. We also compare the EARS methods to a CUSUM-based
method. We find that the baseline EARS system performed poorly in comparison to one of the
LHD variants and the CUSUM-based method. These results suggest that changes in how
syndromes are defined can substantially improve EARS performance. The results also show that
incorporating algorithms that use more historical data will improve EARS performance for routine
surveillance by local health departments.
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1 Introduction: Biosurveillance
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD-21) defines biosurveillance
as “the process of active data-gathering with appropriate analysis and inter-
pretation of biosphere data that might relate to disease activity and threats
to human or animal health – whether infectious, toxic, metabolic, or oth-
erwise, and regardless of intentional or natural origin – in order to achieve
early warning of health threats, early detection of health events, and over-
all situational awareness of disease activity” (U.S. Government, 2007). One
type of biosurveillance is epidemiologic surveillance which HSPD-21 defines as
“the process of actively gathering and analyzing data related to human health
and disease in a population in order to obtain early warning of human health
events, rapid characterization of human disease events, and overall situational
awareness of disease activity in the human population.” Thus, epidemiologic
surveillance addresses that subset of biosurveillance as it applies to human
populations. Syndromic surveillance is a specific type of epidemiologic surveil-
lance that has been defined as “the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis,
interpretation, and application of real-time (or near-real-time) indicators of
diseases and outbreaks that allow for their detection before public health au-
thorities would otherwise note them” (Sosin, 2003). Syndromic surveillance
is epidemiologic surveillance restricted to general illness categories. For addi-
tional background and discussion of biosurveillance in general, and syndromic
surveillance in particular, see Shmueli & Burkom (2010), Fricker (2010b, 2008,
2007), and Fricker & Rolka (2006).
The medical and public health communities are developing biosurveil-
lance systems designed to proactively monitor populations for possible disease
outbreaks1. One goal of these systems is to improve the likelihood that a dis-
ease outbreak, whether man-made or natural, is detected as early as possible
so that the medical and public health communities can respond as quickly as
possible. This goal is often referred to as early event detection (EED). As
shown in Figure 1, a biosurveillance system has four main functions: data col-
lection, data management, analysis, and reporting. The ideal biosurveillance
system analyzes population health-related data in near-real time to identify
subtle trends not visible to individual physicians and clinicians. Many of these
systems use one or more statistical algorithms to assess data for anomalies.
Systems are monitored for anomalies which may then trigger detection, alert-
ing, investigation, quantification, and localization of potential public health
problems.
1In a strict epidemiological context, the term “outbreak” implies an identified chain of
transmission. Here we use the term “outbreak” to denote a sudden increase in the incidence
1
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Figure 1: A biosurveillance system has four main functions: data collection,
data management, analysis, and reporting. Raw data enters the system at
the left and flows through the system to become actionable information at the
right.
Effective early event detection depends on sensitive statistical algo-
rithms, but it also depends on accurate data (which are often daily counts
of individuals classified into one or more syndrome categories). “Accurate”
in this context means the syndrome counts mirror in behavior the underlying
disease that the biosurveillance system is intended to monitor. In particular,
at a minimum the syndrome counts should show increases when the prevalence
of the underlying disease increases and ideally they should show increases that
precede increases in diagnosed cases. Manipulating both the syndrome defini-
tions and the statistical algorithms can affect the performance of a biosurveil-
lance system, where a perfect system would quickly and correctly identify an
increase in disease when one is occurring, yet not falsely signal an outbreak or
epidemic in the absence of one.
This paper looks at how changes in both statistical algorithms and
syndrome definitions affect how one biosurveillance system would have de-
of a disease within a defined population.
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tected the local arrival of the 2009 influenza A H1N1 virus pandemic (often
colloquially referred to as swine flu) in Monterey County, California. That
is, we retrospectively mimic a prospective surveillance system, assessing how
variations in the syndrome definitions and modifications to the statistical al-
gorithms affect the system’s ability to detect a known outbreak.
Comparisons between biosurveillance systems or the algorithms they
use have been not been published in the literature as frequently as some might
desire (Fricker, 2010b). Those related to the system evaluated in this paper
include Hutwagner et al. (2003), Hutwagner et al. (2005), Tokars et al. (2009),
and Fricker et al. (2008a,b). The latter two are the most closely related to
this work, where the statistical algorithms were compared using simulated
data. This work expands on and extends Fricker et al. (2008a,b) in two ways:
(1) it uses actual Monterey County data rather than simulated data, and (2)
it explores how changes in syndrome definitions affect biosurveillance system
performance.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the bio-
surveillance system used in Monterey County, definitional variants for the
influenza-like illness (ILI) syndrome, how the ILI syndrome counts are calcu-
lated, and the various EED algorithms we evaluated. In Section 3 we present
our results, comparing both the performance of the statistical algorithms as
well as the impacts of changing the syndrome definitions. Finally, in Section
4 we discuss our findings and conclusions with a focus on particular improve-
ments that have the potential to dramatically improve biosurveillance system
performance.
2 Biosurveillance in Monterey County, Cali-
fornia
The Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) is a biosurveillance system
that was and continues to be developed by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC, 2007b). Written in SAS, it was originally designed as
a drop-in surveillance system for large-scale events where little or no baseline
data are available (CDC, 2007a). For example, the EARS system was used
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to monitor communicable diseases in
Louisiana (Toprani et al., 2006), for syndromic surveillance at the 2001 Super
Bowl and World Series, as well as at the Democratic National Convention in
2000 (Hutwagner et al., 2003). Though developed as a drop-in surveillance
system, EARS is now used for routine biosurveillance by many state and local
health departments (LHDs), including Monterey County.
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EARS conducts EED by monitoring for increases in syndromes derived
from chief complaints. A syndrome is “a set of symptoms or conditions that
occur together and suggest the presence of a certain disease or an increased
chance of developing the disease” (International Foundation for Functional
Gastrointestinal Disorders, 2010). In the context of syndromic surveillance, a
syndrome is a set of non-specific pre-diagnosis medical and other information
that may indicate the release of a bioterrorism agent or natural increase in dis-
ease. Syndromes monitored by Monterey County include ILI, gastrointestinal,
upper respiratory, lower respiratory, and neurological. A chief complaint is a
brief summary of the reason or reasons that an individual presents at a medi-
cal facility. Written by medical personnel, chief complaints are full of jargon,
acronyms, and abbreviations for use by other medical professionals. To distill
the chief complaints down into syndrome indicators, the text is searched and
parsed for key words, often of necessity including all the ways a particular key
word can be misspelled, abridged, and otherwise abbreviated (Fricker, 2010b).
The Monterey County Health Department (MCHD) is an LHD that
uses EARS V4.5 to monitor chief complaint data from four hospital emergency
rooms (ERs) and six public health clinics, particularly as an alert system for
various types of disease outbreaks which may include those naturally occurring
(e.g., influenza), accidental (e.g., fire-related illnesses), or intentional (e.g.,
bioterrorism). Table 1 gives examples of actual chief complaints taken from
Monterey County clinic data. The results of this study are based on the clinic
data only.
While there are a number of biosurveillance systems available for use,
MCHD uses EARS because it allows them to maintain local control of the
data and because of the system’s flexibility. In particular, MCHD values the
ability in EARS to develop syndromes for unique, local circumstances such
as agriculture pesticide spraying and fire-related illness tracking (Hanni, 2011;
Fricker & Hanni, 2010). While this flexibility is considered a significant benefit
of the system, the effects of changes to EARS syndrome definitions have not
been published in the literature and, thus, the effects of such changes on the
EED ability of the system are unknown.
2.1 Calculating Syndrome Counts
EARS monitors various syndromes for outbreaks based on the presence of key
words in chief complaint records. This is accomplished in two steps. First, the
presence of particular words, word variants, common typos, and associated
medical abbreviations and jargon are searched for in the chief complaint text
and linked to specific symptoms. Second, the symptoms are then analyzed to
4




F/U ASTHMA, FEVER AND COUGH FEVER,PHLEGM
fever x3 days cough 4WK FU OB
FEVER,WHEEZING FEVER
VOMITING,FEVER,POSS EAR INFECT PAP
CHDP COUGH,DXd W/ ASTHMA
WI C/O HA//MM CHDP
PAP DEPO
walk-in hospital fu 4WK FU OB ..OVBK
COLD ABD PAIN CONJESTION
WALK IN BURN TO R-HAND new born with mom
FU RESULTS RASH
FU OB FU WT CHECK
SHLDR PAIN FOR 1 WK PAP
Table 1: Examples of actual chief complaints taken from Monterey County’s
clinic data.
determine the presence of a syndrome. Ultimately, for each syndrome, every
individual in the data is categorized as either having that syndrome or not (so
that individuals can be categorized in multiple syndrome categories).
For example, the flu symptom is the simplest, where the existence of
the word “flu” in an individual’s chief complaint text results in the flu symptom
being set for that individual. More complicated is the fever symptom, where
the presence of the word “fever”, “fver”, “780.6”, or any of another 105 terms
result in the fever symptom being set for the individual. A similar approach is
taken for other symptoms such as sore throat, cold, cough, etc., where for 76
symptoms in the EARS system, there are 9,421 total terms that are searched
for in the chief complaint text, or an average of 124 terms per symptom. At
one extreme is the flu symptom with only one term (“flu”) that is searched
for, while at the other extreme is the abscess symptom with 488 terms.
One of the ways in which EARS can be manipulated at the local level
is by changing how a syndrome is defined. As illustrated in Table 2, MCHD
defined the ILI syndrome in three different ways. According to the EARS
baseline ILI syndrome definition, a record is flagged for ILI when the chief
complaint field contains any one or more of the following symptoms: “sore
throat” or “cold” or “cough” (where the quotation marks are intended to
emphasize that each symptom involves searching through chief complaint text
for a variety of terms).
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ILI Definitions Symptom Combination Logic
EARS Baseline: “cold” or “cough” or “sore throat”
MCHD Expanded: “cold” or “cough” or “fever” or “chills” or “muscle pain” or
“headache” or (“flu” and not “shot”)
MCHD Restricted: (“fever” and “cough”) or (“fever” and “sore throat”) or
(“flu” and not “shot”)
Table 2: ILI definitions. The EARS baseline definition is what is used by
EARS V4.5. The MCHD expanded and restricted definitions are variants
created by the Monterey County Health Department. The quotation marks
around the symptoms are intended to emphasize that each symptom involves
searching through chief complaint text for a series of terms, from just one for
the flu symptom to 236 for the sore throat symptom.
mented the expanded ILI syndrome definition to increase the probability their
system would signal during an outbreak. As shown in Table 2, this expanded
ILI syndrome definition added in fever, chills, muscle pain, headache, and flu
symptoms while deleting the sore throat symptom in the EARS baseline defini-
tion. In addition, it did not count records that included the word “shot” so as
to not count individuals who had received a flu shot (who otherwise would have
been incorrectly included in the ILI syndrome count by virtue of the presence
of the word “flu” in their chief complaint text). This expanded ILI syndrome
definition generated a substantial increase in the daily ILI syndrome counts
and resulted in an estimated rate of ILI that significantly exceeded what was
being reported at the state level via the California Sentinel Provider system.
In October 2009, MCHD subsequently revised the ILI syndrome defi-
nition to better match the California Sentinel Provider system results. Instead
of simply looking for the existence of one or more symptoms, the restricted
ILI syndrome definition now requires more evidence where, as shown in Table
2, two or more symptoms need to be present (fever and cough, for example).
The goal was to better adjust the observed counts to match the California
Sentinel Provider data, where the restricted definition limits incorrectly clas-
sifying individuals with the ILI syndrome who do not actually have the flu,
but this strategy comes at the cost of a greater chance of failing to count those
with the flu in the ILI syndrome.
Prior to emergence of the 2009 H1N1 virus, Monterey County imple-
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The impact of changing the syndrome definitions is quite dramatic, at
least in terms of the total number of individuals classified with the ILI syn-
drome. For example, for one year of Monterey County data, the EARS baseline
definition resulted in just under six percent of the record being classified with
the ILI syndrome (9,093 out of 153,696 records). In contrast, the MCHD
expanded definition resulted in a 53% increase in the number of records clas-
sified as the ILI syndrome (13,956 records or nine percent of the total) while
the MCHD restricted ILI resulted in a 92% reduction of the number of records
(734 or 0.5 percent of the total). Clearly, the choice of syndrome definition can
have a significant effect on the daily syndrome counts, on which the EARS’
detection algorithms rely.
2.2 Early Event Detection Methods
In this section, we define the EARS methods used in EARS V4.5, followed by
the CUSUM methodology, and then we describe how we applied each to the
MCHD data. Subsequent to this research the CDC released a new version of
EARS in which a “4th algorithm choice was added” that is intended to improve
the chance of correctly detecting outbreaks while also decreasing the likelihood
of false positive signals (CDC, 2010). We do not assess the performance of this
new algorithm in this work.
2.2.1 EARS’ C1, C2, and C3
The EARS C1, C2, and C3 methods were intended to be CUSUM-like methods
(Fricker, 2010a; Hutwagner et al., 2003) and, in fact, the EARS documentation,
SAS code, and at least one paper (Zhu et al., 2005) explicitly refer to them as
CUSUMs. However, the C1 and C2 are actually Shewhart variants that use
a moving sample average and sample standard deviation to standardize each
observation. (See Shewhart, 1931, or Montgomery, 2009, for more detail on
the Shewhart method and the next section for the definition of the CUSUM.)
The C1 uses the seven days prior to the current observation to calculate the
sample average and sample standard deviation. The C2 is similar to the C1
but uses the seven days prior to a two-day lag. The C3 combines information
from C2 statistics as described below.
Let Yt be the observed count for period t representing, for example, the
number of individuals classified with a particular syndrome at all the public
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As implemented in the EARS system, the C1 signals at time t when its statistic
exceeds a threshold h, which is fixed at three sample standard deviations above
the sample mean: C1t > 3.
The C2 is similar to the C1, but incorporates a two-day lag in the






















and in EARS it signals when C2t > 3.
The C3 uses the C2 statistics from day t and the previous two days,




max [0,C2i − 1] . (3)
In EARS it signals when C3t > 2. For additional information on EARS and
EARS methods see Fricker (2011, 2008), Fricker et al. (2008a,b), CDC (2006),
and Hutwagner et al. (2005, 2003).
2.2.2 CUSUM
The CUSUM method of Page (1954) and Lorden (1971) is a well known sta-
tistical process control methodology. In that literature it is often referred to
as the CUSUM control chart. Montgomery (2009) is an excellent introduction
to the CUSUM in an industrial statistical process control setting and Hawkins
& Olwell (1998) provides a comprehensive treatment of the CUSUM.
Formally, the CUSUM is a sequential hypothesis test for a change from
a known in-control density f0 to a known alternative density f1. The method
monitors the statistic Ct, which satisfies the recursion
Ct = max[0,Ct−1 + Lt], (4)
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The method is usually started at C0 = 0; it stops and concludes that Yt ∼ f1 at
the first time when Ct > h, for some threshold h that achieves a desired average
time between false signals (ATFS) when Yt ∼ f0 (i.e., when no outbreak is
present).
The ATFS is the mean number of time periods it takes for an EED
method to first signal, starting from some initial state, given there are no
outbreaks. That is, roughly speaking, the ATFS is the expected time to the
first false signal. If the CUSUM is reset to its initial state after each signal,
it is equivalent to the in-control average run length (ARL0) metric used in
statistical process control. For further discussion of the ATFS metric, see
Fricker (2010a,b) and Fricker et al. (2008a).
If f0 and f1 are normal densities with means µ and µ+ δ, with δ > 0
and unit variances, then Equation 4 reduces to
Ct = max[0,Ct−1 + Yt − µ− k], (5)
with k = δ/2, where k is commonly referred to as the reference value. If the
Y s are independent and identically distributed according to f0 before some
unknown change point and according to f1 after the change point, then the
CUSUM has certain optimality properties. See Moustakides (1986) and Ritov
(1990).
Equation 5 is the CUSUM form routinely used, even when the under-
lying assumptions are only approximately met. Also, Equation 5 is a one-sided
CUSUM, meaning that it will only detect increases in the mean. If it is im-
portant to detect both increases and decreases in the mean, a second CUSUM
must be used to detect decreases. In syndromic surveillance, since it is only
important to quickly detect increases in disease incidence, the second CUSUM
is generally unnecessary.
In industrial settings, the CUSUM is often applied directly to the
observations because some control is exhibited over the process such that it
is reasonable to assume f0 is stationary. In syndromic surveillance this is
generally not the case as the data often have uncontrollable systematic trends,
such as seasonal cycles and day-of-the-week effects. One solution is to model
the systematic component of the data, use the model to forecast the next day’s
observation, and then apply the CUSUM to the forecast errors (Montgomery,
2009, pp. 450-457).
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2.2.3 Applying the CUSUM to Adaptive Regression Forecast Er-
rors
We used the “adaptive regression model with sliding baseline” of Burkom
et al. (2006) to model the systematic component of syndromic surveillance
data. The basic idea is as follows. Let Yt be an observation, say the syndrome
count, on day t. Regress the observations for the past n days on time relative
to the current period. Then use the model to predict today’s observation and
apply the CUSUM to the difference between the predicted value and today’s
observed value. Repeat this process each day, always using the most recent n
observations as the sliding baseline in the regression to calculate the forecast
error. For t > n, and assuming a linear formulation with day-of-the-week
effects, the model is
Yi = β0+β1×(i− t+n+1)+β2IMon+β3ITues+β4IWed+β5IThurs+² (6)
for i = t − 1, . . . , t − n and where MCHD clinics are only open on weekdays,
so covariates for the weekend days are not required. The Is are indicators,
where I = 1 on the relevant weekday and I = 0 otherwise, and ² is the error
term which is assumed normally distributed. Of course, as appropriate, the
model can also be adapted to allow for nonlinearities by adding a quadratic
term into Equation 6.
Burkom et al. (2006) used an 8-week sliding baseline (n = 56 based
on a 7-day week). We compared the performance for a variety of n values
and between a linear and quadratic form of the model, similar to Fricker et al.
(2008a), and found that n = 35 (a 7-week sliding baseline based on a 5-day
week) without a quadratic term worked best. Our judgement of “best” was
based on: (1) the number of weeks in the sliding baseline was similar to that
recommended in Burkom et al. (2006) and used in Fricker et al. (2008a,b),
and, (2) the forecast errors were normally distributed.
The model is fit using ordinary least squares, regressing (at each time
t) Yt−1, . . . , Yt−n on n, . . . , 1, where n must be greater than p, the number of
covariates to be estimated in the model. Having fit the model, the forecast
error when day t is a Friday is
Rt = Yt −
[
βˆ0 + βˆ1 × (n+ 1)
]
,
where βˆ0 is the estimated slope and βˆ1 is the estimated intercept. For any
other day of the week the forecast error is
Rt = Yt −
[
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j = 2, 3, 4, 5, where βˆ2 is the estimated day-of-the-week effect for Monday, βˆ3
is for Tuesday, βˆ4 is for Wednesday, and βˆ5 is for Thursday. Standardizing,
we have Zt = Rt/σˆt where, following Fricker et al. (2008a) and assuming the
forecast errors are independent with expected value zero (reasonable assump-
tions based on an analysis of the actual forecast errors; see Hagen, 2010), we












In Equation 7, x0 is the covariate vector for day t, where for example for Mon-
day x0 = {1, 36, 1, 0, 0, 0}, and X is the 35× 6 associated matrix of covariates
for the previous 35 days, for this example:
X =

1 35 0 0 0 0
1 34 0 0 0 1







1 3 0 0 1 0
1 2 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0

.
The CUSUM applied to this problem is thus
Ct = max[0,Ct−1 + Zt − k], (8)
where each day the adaptive regression is re-fit to the past 35 days of data, the
current day’s forecast error is calculated and standardized, and the resulting
Zt is used in the CUSUM. Intuitively the idea is that an outbreak will result in
larger than expected positive forecast errors and their values will accumulate
in the CUSUM and eventually result in a signal.
In applying the CUSUM, we used three variants – based on the values
of k and h – to illustrate a range of performance. As shown in Table 3,
we called these “aggressive,” “moderate,” and “routine.” CUSUM1 is called
aggressive because, based on k = 0.5, it will signal quickly for a one standard
deviation increase in the forecast errors, and with k = 0.5 and h = 0.365 it
has an ATFS of 5 days. Intuitively, one can think of small ATFS values giving
the CUSUM a higher probability of detecting outbreaks, but at the expense of
a higher false positive signal rate, where an ATFS of 5 days means that there
will be a false positive signal once a week on average (assuming the CUSUM
is reset after each signal).
11
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Type Label k h ATFS
Aggressive: CUSUM1 0.5 0.365 5
Moderate: CUSUM2 1.0 0.695 20
Routine: CUSUM3 1.0 1.200 60
Table 3: Parameters for the three CUSUM variants we used. The choices were
based on the average time to first signal (ATFS) metric, where CUSUM1 is
designed to have a high probability of signaling an actual outbreak and, con-
comitently, a higher false positive signal rate. At the other extreme, CUSUM3
is designed to have a low false positive rate as well as a lower probability of
signaling an actual outbreak.
In comparison, CUSUM2 is called moderate because, based on k = 1.0,
it will signal quickly for a two standard deviation increase in the forecast errors,
and with k = 1.0 and h = 0.695 it has an ATFS of 20 days. Thus CUSUM2
will be less sensitive than CUSUM1 but it will also have fewer false positive
signals, with only one per month on average (four times less than CUSUM1).
Finally, CUSUM3 is called routine because, while it will signal quickly for
a two standard deviation increase in the forecast errors like CUSUM2, with
k = 1.0 and h = 1.2 it has an ATFS of 60 days. Thus CUSUM3 will be less
sensitive than either CUSUM1 or CUSUM2, but it will also only have a false
positive signal once per quarter on average.
3 Results
In this section, we first discuss how we determined when the seasonal ILI and
2009 H1N1 pandemic outbreaks occurred in Monterey County. We then apply
the EARS’ and CUSUM-based detection algorithms to the three sets of ILI
syndrome data (CDC baseline, MCHD expanded, MCHD restricted).
3.1 Determining the Outbreak Periods
In order to judge how well the various detection methods perform, we first
sought to establish when the seasonal ILI and 2009 H1N1 pandemic outbreaks
actually occurred within Monterey County. As anyone who has attempted
to do this will recognize, establishing some sort of universal “ground truth”
about precisely when an outbreak started is often elusive. Not only can the
timing of the outbreak vary by geography and subpopulation, but the data can
be quite imprecise. Furthermore the determination can at times be circular
12
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in the sense that knowledge of the start of an outbreak is required to judge
algorithm performance but the algorithms are sometimes the most effective
way to determine the outbreak start.
In this case, as shown in Figure 2, we looked at four sources of in-
formation. The figure shows the reported weekly percentage of patients clas-
sified with influenza-like illness (ILI) from September 28, 2008 to January 2,
2010, along with locally-weighted smoothing lines to better show the under-
lying trends, using data from: (1) the California Sentinel Provider Influenza
Surveillance Program, (2) Monterey County hospital ERs, and (3) Monterey
County public health clinics, as well as (4) laboratory-confirmed, hospitalized
cases of 2009 H1N1 in Monterey County. These four sets of data reflect four
different populations.
The first population consists of patients seen by medical providers
throughout the state of California who voluntarily conduct surveillance for ILI
and report weekly to the CDC. As described on the California Department of
Public Health’s web site (California Department of Public Health, 2010), the
case definition for ILI is any illness with fever greater than 100◦F and cough
and/or sore throat (in the absence of a known cause). As such, the circles in
Figure 2 are a measure of ILI activity throughout the entire state. The solid
black line is locally-weighted smoothing line to better show the underlying
trends in the state-level data.
The second population, represented by the triangles and associated
dashed line in Figure 2, are individuals who went to an emergency room of
one of the four Monterey County hospitals and who were subsequently clas-
sified with ILI by EARS using the MCHD restricted definition. The third
population, represented by the crosses and the associated dashed line, are in-
dividuals who went to one of six Monterey County public clinics and who were
subsequently classified with ILI by EARS using the restricted definition.
Finally, the fourth population is the entire population of Monterey
County and the data are the laboratory-confirmed, hospitalized cases of 2009
H1N1 in Monterey County. These are shown as the black diamonds at the
bottom of the plot, where each diamond represents one person and is plotted
for the week the individual first became symptomatic due to 2009 H1N1 virus
infection. A note about these data is in order: At the epidemic’s onset, medical
providers were required to report all laboratory-confirmed cases of 2009 H1N1
to their local health jurisdictions under Title 17 of the California Code of
Regulations. In May 2009, the provider reporting requirements were restricted
to fatal and/or hospitalized, laboratory-confirmed 2009 H1N1 cases. This
allowed health officials to focus on the determinants of severe illness. Providers
were encouraged to use clinical presentation rather than laboratory testing
13
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Figure 2: Percentage of patients classified with ILI from September 28, 2008
(week 40) to January 2, 2010 (week 52) for: (1) the California Sentinel Provider
system, (2) Monterey hospital ERs, and (3) Monterey public health clinics.
The diamonds are laboratory-confirmed, hospitalized cases of 2009 H1N1 in
Monterey County, where each diamond represents one person and is plotted for
the week the individual first became symptomatic due to 2009 H1N1 infection.
The arrows show that week 32 had 10 cases and week 35 had 20 cases.
to guide management of patients. Widespread laboratory testing was not
recommended. The reporting requirements were further restricted in May
2010 to laboratory-confirmed cases resulting in Intensive Care Unit admission
and/or death. Therefore, no centralized database of outpatient 2009 H1N1
cases, which represented the majority of 2009 H1N1 infections, exists with
which we could compare ILI reports.
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In looking at the smoothed curves in Figure 2, we expected the MCHD
hospital ER and clinic ILI syndrome trends would closely match the California
Sentinel Provider data, and the three time series do show similar patterns.
However, there are also some differences. For example, as highlighted by the
left-most shaded region in Figure 2, the seasonal ILI pattern is visible with
similar trends in both the sentinel provider and hospital data, starting late in
week 50 and peaking in week 6, but in the clinic data seasonal ILI is much less
evident and seems to start later, showing up as a slight increase starting around
week 2 and peaking in week 5. Further, note that the statewide seasonal ILI
pattern peaks from weeks 5 to 9 while the Monterey County hospital ERs
and clinics have a much sharper peak around week 5 or 6 after which the ILI
incidence decreases substantially. This pattern is consistent with the fact that
the California Sentinel Provider data are for the whole state, where the longer
peak likely reflects the outbreak occurring in different times and parts of the
state. Monterey County is a small geographic location, and it appears the ILI
had peaked early on in this location compared to the entire state.
As for the second outbreak period in Figure 2 (the “2009 H1N1 1st
Wave”), there is consistency across all three time series, with the 2009 H1N1
pandemic starting in week 14 and peaking in week 18 of 2009. Subsequent to
the first wave, a second wave of the H1N1 pandemic (“2009 H1N1 2nd Wave”
in the figure) may have started as early as week 24 and peaked somewhere
between weeks 35 and 44. This is where there is a bit of divergence between
the three time series. The hospital ERs show an initial spike at weeks 34 and 35
followed by a larger peak around week 42 and then a subsequent decline. The
California Sentinel Provider data and the clinic data are consistent with this
later peak around weeks 42 to 44, but they both show a more gradual increase
to the peak and no spike at weeks 34 and 35. Perhaps the difference is that
the 2009 H1N1 virus spread slightly differently in the population served by
the Monterey County hospitals or perhaps during the weeks 34-35 peak people
were more likely to go to the ER than the public clinics. These differences may
also be due to how people use hospitals versus clinics and the severity of or
worry about their symptoms. The laboratory-confirmed, hospitalized cases at
the bottom show a combination of the two trends, where we see that weeks
26, 32 and 34 through 36 had spikes in cases, but the entire “2009 H1N1 2nd
Wave” period shows substantial 2009 H1N1 activity.
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What Figure 2 illustrates is that the outbreak indications are quite
similar across the three populations. However, it is important to note that
the clinic and hospital percentage of ILI are based on MCHD’s restricted ILI
syndrome definition. As such, it is not obvious that these observed trends will
manifest in the same way in the raw daily count data and under the baseline
and expanded ILI definitions. However, as shown in Figure 3, the dates do in
fact match up fairly well. Thus, regardless of the definition used, Monterey
County clinic ILI syndrome data followed the sentinel provider trends fairly
closely. Thus, for the remainder of this paper, “ground truth” will be taken
to be the three periods of rising counts shown via the shaded areas in Figures
2 and 3. These correspond to:
• Seasonal ILI outbreak period: 12/12/2008 (week 50) – 2/13/2009 (week
6),
• First 2009 H1N1 pandemic outbreak period: 4/6/2009 (week 14) – 5/8/2009
(week 18),
• Second 2009 H1N1 pandemic outbreak period: 6/15/2009 (week 24) –
11/6/2009 (week 44),
where by “outbreak period” we mean that period of time in which the syn-
drome counts were increasing from their nominal state up to some peak. We
focus on this period as the point of EED is to identify the start of the outbreak
as soon as possible.
3.2 Assessing Performance
To assess the performance of the algorithms for the various syndrome defi-
nitions, we ran the EARS methods and the three CUSUMs (as described in
Section 2) on the daily counts derived for the baseline, expanded, and re-
stricted ILI syndrome definitions and compared the resulting signals to the
outbreak periods. In so doing, we followed current MCHD practice of not
resetting the algorithms after each signal. See Fricker (2010a,b) for additional
discussion about the pros and cons of such practice.
3.2.1 Using EARS Baseline ILI Definition
Figure 4 compares the results of the six EED algorithms under the CDC
baseline ILI syndrome definition. As in Figure 3, the small circles on the
graph are the aggregate daily ILI counts for Monterey County clinics and the
16






















Figure 3: Comparison of the estimated ILI counts using the baseline, ex-
panded, and restricted definitions. The shaded areas, which match those of
Figure 2, show that the three outbreak periods are largely consistent across
the different populations and ILI syndrome definitions.
black line is a locally-weighted smoothing line to show the underlying trends
in the data. The shaded areas denote the three outbreak periods that were
just defined: the seasonal ILI followed by the two 2009 H1N1 waves. Finally,
at the top of the plot are the daily signals for the six detection algorithms. A
signal on a particular day is denoted by a vertical line “|”, where heavier black
bars simply indicate a sequence of daily signals.
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Figure 4 shows that, right at the start of the seasonal ILI outbreak
(i.e., at week 51 or December 15, 2008), all EED methods with the exception
of CUSUM3 signaled (and, in fact, CUSUM1 signaled for three consecutive
days). Subsequent to the initial signal, the EARS C1 and C3 methods each
only signaled one additional time during the outbreak period. In comparison,
the CUSUM methods continued to signal periodically throughout the outbreak
period and in a manner consistent with their design. That is, CUSUM1 was
designed to be the most sensitive, CUSUM2 less so, and CUSUM3 the least
sensitive. Of course, this comes with the trade-off that the more sensitive the
CUSUM the more it also signals in the non-outbreak periods as well.
For the first 2009 H1N1 outbreak period (e.g., weeks 14-19), none of
the methods signalled at the outset of the outbreak period – though the fact
that CUSUM1 signals two days prior and CUSUM2 signals three days prior
might be an indication that the outbreak period started a few days earlier
than the shading shows. What is clear is that the EARS C1 and C2 methods
completely miss the outbreak while the C3 only signals once at the peak of the
outbreak. In contrast, the CUSUM methods all signal more consistently and
regularly and, with the exception of CUSUM3, earlier than C3. Finally, for
the second 2009 H1N1 outbreak period (weeks 24-44), CUSUM1 signals right
at the outset of the outbreak period with CUSUM2 and C3 following five and
seven days later, respectively. However, C2 fails to signal at all while C1 takes
16 days to signal and CUSUM3 takes 22 days.
3.2.2 Using MCHD Expanded ILI Definition
Figure 5 compares the performance of the six EED algorithms under the
MCHD expanded ILI syndrome definition. What is most striking in this plot
is the complete lack of signals over all three outbreak periods for the C1 and
C2 methods. In particular, note the large observation of y = 100 in week 52
(that occurred on December 22nd) where, for this particular day, the estimated
standard deviations (S1 in Equation 1 and S3 in Equation 2) are so large that
the resulting statistics are just below the signaling threshold. And, while the
C3 method does signal for the 2009 H1N1 outbreak periods, the initial signals
are 17 and 18 days after the start of the outbreak, respectively, which is more
than a three week delay. The CUSUM methods seem to do better, though
CUSUM1 and CUSUM2 each have delays of six days for the first 2009 H1N1
outbreak and 7 days for the second 2009 H1N1 outbreak, and the CUSUM3
does not perform any better than the C3 in terms of delay.
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Figure 4: Algorithm signal times using the CDC baseline ILI syndrome def-
inition. A signal on a particular day is denoted by a vertical line “|” and
the heavier black bars indicate a sequence of daily signals. The circles are
the aggregate daily ILI counts for Monterey County clinics (based on the
CDC baseline ILI syndrome definition) and the black line is a locally-weighted
smoothing line to show the underlying trends.
Thus, the most important result is that all of the methods perform sub-
stantially worse using the MCHD expanded ILI syndrome definition compared
to the CDC baseline definition. This is surprising because, in implementing
this definition, MCHD intended to make the EARS system more sensitive to
detecting outbreaks yet, at least for these three outbreak periods, the expanded
definition does just the opposite. The explanation for this outcome, which is
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clear in hindsight, is that the expanded definition introduced excessive noise
into the data. That is, it classifies individuals with ILI who should not have
been and thus masks the outbreak signals with noise. This introduction of
noise is evident in Figure 3 where the MCHD expanded ILI syndrome curve
essentially mirrors the CDC baseline curve, except it is shifted upwards.
3.2.3 Using MCHD Restricted ILI Definition
Figure 6 compares the performance of six EED algorithms under the MCHD
restricted ILI syndrome definition. Here we see that the CUSUM methods
perform better than the EARS methods using the other ILI definitions in
the sense that they more regularly signal during the outbreak periods. Fur-
thermore, many of the EARS and CUSUM methods’ signals tend to align
temporally suggesting that all the methods are detecting similar aberrations
in the restricted data.
Comparing back to Figure 4, with the exception of CUSUM3, it ap-
pears that all of the methods are slower at detecting the seasonal ILI outbreak.
However, this conclusion is confounded by the fact that the shaded area better
corresponds to when the baseline and expanded data show an up-tick. The
restricted data do not show an increase in ILI counts until week 52 or so, which
is when the CUSUMs signal. Whether the outbreak actually began in week
50, 51, or 52 for the population served by the clinics is simply unknowable.
It is clear, however, that the CUSUM methods signal the seasonal ILI earlier
than the EARS methods.
3.2.4 Summarizing the Results
Visually, the restricted ILI syndrome definition seems to result in better al-
gorithm performance, particularly for the EARS methods. To more formally
and quantitatively compare between ILI syndrome definitions and detection
algorithms, we define the following four metrics. First, we define sensitivity as
the number of outbreak period days with a signal divided by the number of
outbreak period days. That is,
sensitivity =
# outbreak period days with signal
# outbreak period days
=
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Figure 5: Algorithm signal times using the MCHD expanded ILI syndrome
definition. A signal on a particular day is denoted by a vertical line “|” and
the heavier black bars indicate a sequence of daily signals. The circles are the
aggregate daily ILI counts for Monterey County clinics (based on the MCHD
expanded ILI syndrome definition) and the black line is a locally-weighted
smoothing line to show the underlying trends.
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Figure 6: Algorithm signal times using the MCHD restricted ILI syndrome
definition. A signal on a particular day is denoted by a vertical line “|” and
the heavier black bars indicate a sequence of daily signals. The circles are the
aggregate daily ILI counts for Monterey County clinics (based on the MCHD
restricted ILI syndrome definition) and the black line is a locally-weighted
smoothing line to show the underlying trends.
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Second, we define specificity as the number of non-outbreak period days with-
out a signal divided by the number of non-outbreak period days. That is,
specificity =
# non-outbreak period days without signal
# non-outbreak period days
=
# non-outbreak period days without signal
183
.
Note that we have specifically defined sensitivity and specificity in terms of
the outbreak periods, which are those periods in which syndrome counts are
increasing from their nominal levels. As such, these metrics are intended to
measure how well the EED methods signal during those periods of time when
an outbreak has started and is increasing.
Third, we define the average delay , denoted d¯1, as the average time
it takes an algorithm to signal from the start of the outbreak period, where
for a perfect algorithm that signalled on the first day of all three outbreak
periods d¯1 = 0. Finally, we define the average delay from first signal , denoted
d¯2, as the average time it takes an algorithm to signal from the time of the
earliest signal of all six algorithms within a given outbreak period, where if
an algorithm consistently signalled first for all three outbreak periods then
d¯2 = 0.
Given these metrics, Table 4 quantifies the performance of the six EED
algorithms under three ILI definitions. Note that the “+” sign after some of
the average delay measures in the table indicates that the algorithm failed to
signal during one or more outbreak periods. When this happened, the length
of the outbreak period was used in place of the (nonexistent) delay and hence
the average delay shown is an underestimate of the actual average delay.
Table 4 clearly demonstrates the benefit of the MCHD restricted ILI
definition. In particular, for the EARS methods it both improves sensitivity
(at a very modest cost to specificity) and the delay times. Simply put, under
the restricted ILI definition, the EARS methods had a higher probability of
signalling during an outbreak period and they signalled faster. The restricted
ILI definition also improved the performance of the CUSUM methods, again
increasing sensitivity and generally decreasing the delay.
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CDC Baseline MCHD Expanded MCHD Restricted
Algorithm Sens. Spec. d¯1 d¯2 Sens. Spec. d¯1 d¯2 Sens. Spec. d¯1 d¯2
C1 0.02 0.99 14+ 11+ 0.00 1.00 57+ 52+ 0.06 0.98 9.7 6.0
C2 0.01 0.99 43+ 40+ 0.00 1.00 57+ 52+ 0.08 0.98 9.7 6.0
C3 0.03 0.98 8.7 5.7 0.04 0.98 26+ 21+ 0.13 0.93 9.7 6.0
CUSUM1 0.55 0.75 3.0 0.0 0.58 0.77 4.7 0.0 0.62 0.76 3.7 0.0
CUSUM2 0.21 0.93 4.7 1.7 0.18 0.97 6.3 1.7 0.28 0.95 7.0 3.3
CUSUM3 0.09 0.97 14.7 11.7 0.14 0.99 14.7 10.0 0.21 0.98 10.7 7.0
Table 4: Performance of the six EED algorithms under the three ILI syndrome
definitions. The “+” sign after some of the average delay measures means the
algorithm failed to signal during one or more outbreak periods. When this
happened, the length of the outbreak period was used in place of the delay
and hence the average delay shown is an underestimate of the actual average
delay.
When comparing between the EARS and CUSUMmethods, the CUSUM
is clearly superior in this application. However, this should not be surprising
for a number of reasons. First, the CUSUM as implemented here has the ad-
vantage of using much more historical data than the EARS methods: 35 days
versus 7 days. This gives the CUSUM more power to detect changes. Sec-
ond, the CUSUM is inherently able to detect smaller (mean) changes than the
EARS methods because the CUSUM is designed to accumulate evidence over
time. In the statistical process control literature, this is a well-known property
of the CUSUM when compared to Shewhart methods such as the EARS’ C1
and C2. Third, EARS v4.5 is designed for a 7-day week and thus the lack
of clinic weekend data actually inhibits EARS performance in this particular
application. Finally, fourth, we allowed the CUSUM to have adjustable pa-
rameters (h and k), so we were able to in a sense fine tune the CUSUM to the
conditions. In comparison, in EARS v4.5 the C1, C2, and C3 thresholds are
fixed at values that are unlikely to be preferred under all conditions.
When comparing among the CUSUM methods, CUSUM1 clearly had
the best performance in terms of average delay, followed by CUSUM2, and
then CUSUM3. This is not surprising since that is how the CUSUMs were de-
fined: aggressive, moderate, and routine. The speed-of-detection performance
of the CUSUM1 does not come for free, however. The cost is in terms of the
specificity, which characterizes the false signal rate. In particular, we see that
CUSUM1 signals roughly one day out of every four when there is no outbreak.
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This is likely to be unacceptably high. If so, then adjusting the CUSUM’s
parameters, such as with CUSUM2 and CUSUM3, can reduce the false signal
rate, though this will come at the cost of additional delay and reduced sensitiv-
ity. For example, under the restricted ILI definition, switching from CUSUM1
to CUSUM2 will decrease the rate of false signals from 1 per 4 days to 1 per
20, but it will also add an additional three days of delay or so. Ultimately,
these sorts of trade-offs should be made by the public health practitioner in
the context of the public health threats being faced and the resources available
to investigate biosurveillance signals.
4 Conclusions & Discussion
Biosurveillance systems have great promise as a public health tool for im-
proving population health and well-being. They also have the potential to
improve public health response to natural disease outbreaks and bioterrorism.
However, continuing research is necessary to better understand how to most
effectively design and employ them.
For example, as these results have shown, biosurveillance system early
event detection performance can be improved with changes in syndrome def-
initions. This idea is simple: to the extent that noise can be eliminated from
the data, it will be easier for detection algorithms to identify anomalies in the
data. To date more research has been focused on developing complicated and
sophisticated detection algorithms rather than improving the data upon which
the algorithms are run. However, arguably, better data is the “low hanging
fruit” with the potential to significantly improve biosurveillance performance.
Greater emphasis should therefore be focused on improvements in the data:
collection, management, text searching logic, syndrome definitions, etc. This
is a non-trivial exercise, particularly for rarely occurring diseases and bioter-
rorism agents for which (thankfully) there are little to no data from which to
assess detection performance.
In this research we had three clear outbreaks from which to assess
performance, but that is not the usual case, and even in this research we could
not be definitive about precise outbreak start times. Surprisingly, under the
CDC baseline and MCHD expanded ILI definitions, EARS methods were of
little to no value in signaling an outbreak. Furthermore, we note that while the
MCHD restricted ILI definition performed well, at least in comparison to the
baseline and expanded definitions, there could very well be other definitions
that perform even better. This finding was enlightening for us and underscores
the need for additional research into syndrome definitions.
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This work has also clearly shown that there are alternatives to the
EARS C1, C2, and C3 detection algorithms that have better performance
characteristics. Ultimately, it was CUSUM1 that proved the most reliable at
signaling alarms prior to and throughout the time when Monterey County was
experiencing 2009 H1N1 cases. Whether the CDC incorporates a CUSUM-
based method into EARS or not, it is clear that the design of the EARS algo-
rithms for drop-in surveillance impedes their performance for routine surveil-
lance when more historical data are available. For the EARS system, as well
as other biosurveillance systems, the principle is simple: form should follow
from function. Thus, for EARS routine surveillance implementations that have
more historical data, future design modifications should allow local users to
exploit all the information available in the data.
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